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Home > Info Centre > Publications > Alert 2000 > Coming of Age: The Internal Security Delima | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The origins "Crime and violence" is nothing new to Jamaica or the Caribbean region. An examination of our history reveals that the subhuman conditions of slavery and the iniquities of the class system have taken their toll. Out of this climate grew deep-seated hatred of authority and also defiance. Our history reveals numerous protests, whether they be rebellions, industrial actions or, simply demonstrations, against the status quo, most of which have seen the use of the various arms of Government in an effort to enforce existing laws. Two such come to mind. They are the Military and Police forces of the colonial era, out of which evolved the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Jamaica Defence Force. Today these agencies represent the arms of Government that are on the "front-line" in the enforcement of law and order. The problems experienced in today’s society are not far removed from those which occurred under colonialism; there is still a lack of jobs for persons who are employable; there is a lack of personal or collective motivation for honest labour; the society is rife with corruption; there is still a distinct lack of education and insufficient opportunities for people to avail themselves of this absolute necessity; there is still perceived unwillingness on the part of successive Governments to educate the population; and the freeness mentality which is, arguably, a direct result of slavery. The plantocracy system still abounds as well as the societal class structure. In this context, we are witnessing increased crime and violence marked by the emergence of "quick-money" syndromes, such as illegal drug trafficking which, when combined with other crimes, result in devastating consequences for the region. Survival for the "under privileged", under current economic and violent conditions, has been interpreted to mean the use of one’s talents against societal norms, rules and regulations, in an effort to achieve what is perceived to be an acceptable standard of living. What then are the causes of crime that lead to the use of Government agencies to maintain law and order? When one examines the population demographics as done by Don Robotham, Professor of Anthology, in his article in the Gleaner entitled "Crime and Public Policy" (August 1999) the reality hits home as, "the 15 – 29 age group is responsible for approximately 75% of all violent crimes in Jamaica in the last ten years…Of the 122,961 unemployed in 1998,31.2% had been unemployed for less than 5 months, 24.3% for between 6 and 11 months and as many as 44.5% (54,719 persons) were long-term unemployed….Of this long term unemployed 63.2% has never worked….. Of all youth unemployed, 73.7% have had no educational certification of any kind although 26.8% have four years or more secondary education." Joint operations Joint operations in the internal security context refers to those operations conducted by the police and the military together. Such manoeuvers are provided for in the law (see Defence Act, Manual of Military Law, Section 9(2) and the military component provides the required assistance for the police. Here the police have primacy in the conduct of all operations, save for the tactical imput needed to bring some incidents to a closure. The doctrine teaches that the police, having discerned that the situation is out of control, or is beyond their capability, request formally that the military be called in to assist them in the maintenance of law and order. The maintenance of law and order is but one of many purposes for which military force may be applied. Unlike the police, the military’s training is skewed in favour of scenarios that demand heavy force. The soldier is trained in the management of violence. Different levels of war will require different levels of force. Legal constraints are placed upon the military in low intensity conflicts, such as Internal Security Operations, to protect the civil population from the deleterious effects of violence. Where there is no clearly defined "enemy", as obtains in Internal Security Operations, the full weight of the law demands that all actions by the military be justifiable in a court of law. Rules of engagement recognize that in our practice of Internal Security Operations the police operate at their upper limits of tolerable force and soldiers at their minimal limits of force projection. Successive joint operations since Independence have tended to further complicate the issue. It is extremely difficult to recall an incident that has truly been one that could not be handled by policing methodologies, as violent as they may have been. Military Staff often question the justifications advanced by the police for requesting military support. Successive political administrations have however sanctioned the joint Police Military operation concept whenever the police have called for such support. The policeman and the soldier are expected to transcend all obstacles and perform their duties professionally. As the economic situation worsens the resources needed to combat crime lessens, there is the constant struggle on the part of both organizations to maintain high moral and ethical standards. The question arises then as to what has been the effects of joint operations upon the police, the military and the public generally, over the years. A reflection on the JCF The unbroken reliance of the police on the military for routine operational support sends a message of JCF dependency. This dependency syndrome has contributed to a subtle but meaningful deviation away from the basic tenets of community policing. The syndrome further creates individuals who lack self-confidence. Some policemen have routinely refused to conduct certain operations unless accompanied by soldiers, especially in what is termed the troubled areas. This lack of self-confidence may influence an excessive application of violence, or, the use of excessive numbers, creating undue alarm in the eyes of the public and at the same time putting great strain on ones manpower resources. Nevertheless, the JCF views such operations as being extremely effective and a major solution for conflict within the troubled areas. The effect on the Military Joint Operations, when conducted for the right reasons, normally reap the desired results. The JDF’s reality, however, has been one of being called in from the very beginning of a situation to assist the JCF and remaining there indefinitely. These operations are usually manpower intensive for the JDF and there are normally three or four such running concurrently. Their continuous nature also lends to unhealthy cross-fertilization of habits and practices between soldiers and policemen. Over time the military competencies suffer. Public perspective There is no doubt that respect for the military still exists across the length and breath of our country and even overseas. However, what is also true is the fact that this has diminished steadily over the years. Much of this can be attributed to the military’s "overexposure" to the public by way of continuous joint operations. The age old adage "familiarity breeds contempt" holds true and is cemented, when the last bastion of discipline succumbs to peer pressure resulting in the unnecessary and unwarranted application of violence upon our own people. Contempt for the soldier then sets in deeply in the minds of the public and in certain areas it is passed on from generation to generation. In some communities joint operations are a "Godsend" as without them the communities would be like a war zone. The old poultice when applied to the many facets of the Internal Security Dilemma has not been able to heal the many sores. The only solution is to adopt a remedy that will allow the issues to be raised simultaneously. Such a remedy must have as its focal point the efficient usage of the nation’s human resources. Success would signify that we as a nation have come of age. Possible solutions It is the author’s view that the key to the problem faced by the nation today is for the people and, by extension, the government to exhibit the resolve to address the issues in a meaningful way, stipulating short, medium and long term plans, using measurable objectives. Next, we should be equally resolute in ensuring that we maintain a police force capable of efficiently and effectively policing the nation. The police force should remain a separate body from the military, which is trained to function differently and therefore serves a totally different purpose. In an effort to bring things back into the right perspective the deployment of the military should be curtailed to those situations where it is clear that it is not one with which the police is capable of dealing. The aim of the military under such circumstances would be to have the situation resolved within a specific time period and hand-over to the police. Perhaps the most important aspect of the strategy requires social action that will ensure that people are educated. Government must provide the resources to do this, ensuring; an understanding of societal norms; basic literacy and numeracy, leading to higher educational opportunities and achievements. There should be early implementation at the primary level with a continuous upgrading programme through secondary to tertiary educational standards. What is needed immediately is a starting point and the realization that the nation may have to declare certain generations beyond redemption. The education thrust should also extend to the police and the military in order to achieve the desired results. There is need for scientific research and experimentation to arrive at things such as, individual and collective profiles to aid the police in understanding the criminal pattern, its trends, characteristics, causation, cognitive thought processes, morals, values and attitudes. These must all be understood. The appropriate knowledge will enable the Security Forces to apply efficient and effective methodologies when dealing with crime in the Internal Security scenario. Because of the changing nature of our society, it must be recognized that this aspect has to be dynamic and the provisions must cater for continuous learning within these arms of government. Accompanying improved educational opportunities must be job creation. Without such a guarantee the programme will fail. There must also be a programme that concentrates on the physical upgrading of the present inner-city infrastructure. Such a programme must be geared towards making the surroundings more pleasant to the mind, whilst evoking self-pride in its future care. Residents must feel that the government cares for them as much as those living in "upper St Andrew". They ought to participate in the decision making process, thereby creating the buy-in or support for the development. Those persons benefiting should develop systems and processes by which the social infrastructure, implemented by government, can be maintained and improved upon. Finally, the author recognizes the fact that no government can tackle a task of this magnitude on its own, particularly when all the problems outlined were not the creation of such an entity. Everyone must resolve to solve the problem. In so saying the Public and Private Sectors must establish a social partnership in which each is prepared to address the tasks already outlined and see the process through to a desirable end. A national strategy should therefore be developed and presented to the nation, ensuring its support. The solutions should be tabled, together with any others, prioritized and implemented. Care must be taken to ensure that whilst the arm of the law is being exercised there is clear evidence of the social infrastructural programme in motion. This should create a desirable situation; namely that of communities at peace adhering to accepted societal norms with a healthy respect for the laws of the land. Successive Commissioners of Police and Chiefs of Staff have grappled with the Internal Security dilemma throughout the history of both organizations. However, achievements have generally been temporary as unacceptable crime levels inevitably return. The meaningful and concurrent enhancement of the social infrastructure can provide an acceptable alternative for exercising creativity, thereby making a life of crime far less desirable. Of significance then is the understanding of what confronts us as government’s security arms, and a nation, specifically.
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