Future of Peace Support Operations in the Caribbean

Home > Info Centre > Publications > Alert 1998 > Future of Peace Support Ops in the Caribbean

Future of Peace Support
Operations in the Caribbean
by Major Calvin Bishop, BSc(Hons) pjsc pcsc, Tninidad & Tobago Defence Force

Introduction

CARICOM troops on parade.

Caribbean troops have been called out twice in warlike circumstances since 1983 – Grenada in 1983 and Haiti in 1994. The deployment to Haiti along with the region’s prior involvement in election supervision, reflects the enhanced role expected from regional security forces in the post cold war world. Sir Alister McIntyre UWI Vice Chancellor has also argued for Caribbean states to become "honest brokers" for the international community. Our hemispheric superpower has been calling on regional groups to play a greater role in peacekeeping efforts as US policy appears to guide that it will respond to crisis with the nations in a region, so as to share the increasing costs and risks associated with peacekeeping operations.

Since 1985, US military assistance to the Caribbean has increased significantly, all geared towards building cohesion in the region, but the participating Caribbean force for Haiti had to be built from scratch. It means that any look to the future must again consider how CARICOM can structure, train, equip, support and administer a force that be can readily assemble for the maintenance of international peace and security in the region.

The Caribbean Basin

In geopolitical terms the United States has defined the area immediately southward of its borders as the Caribbean Basin. This concept joins the Caribbean to Central America as it includes the islands and mainland countries that are washed by the Caribbean Sea. Militarily, the US unified command plan states that one commander will control all military activity in the Caribbean, Central and South America with effect from 01 June, 1997. (Though historically, these three areas have shared very few linkages). From 1995 however, Caribbean Defence Force officers have exercised in Central America through attachments to the Belize Defence Force, and more recently through direct invitation.

Nonetheless, economic concerns are common throughout the Basin and individual countries are financially strapped. Some states are relatively better off than others but their meagre circumstances do not allow them to redirect resources away from pressing national concerns. Therefore, while CARICOM accepts its responsibility as member states of the international community, any regional approach will need to be sponsored to a considerable extent as was done in Haiti. This will include assistance during preparation, and sustainment once deployed in theatre.

In addition, although this region has not been entirely free from war, an analysis of the security environment would conclude that in general terms it is now one of peace, particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean. Looking globally, evidence points to the complexity of the modern peacekeeping environment, where a lack of understanding of the cultures of the other partners can easily create difficulties in the mission area. While some argue that a good peacekeeper is a soldier with good combat skills, I contend that there is need for other specialist training, such as language and basic negotiation skills, if CARICOM peacekeepers are to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. I will therefore advocate the setting up of a peacekeeping school that can serve the nations in the region.

Legal Framework

Chapter 8 of the UN Charter allows for regional arrangements. In the case of the OECS countries, there is a provision for collective security arrangements with Barbados through a Memorandum of Understanding. The CARICOM Treaty though does not explicitly provide for security even though it places a responsibility on the Council for Foreign and Community Relations to determine relations between the community and international organizations and seek to establish measures to co-ordinate policies including the adoption of Community positions on major hemispheric and international issues as far as is practicable. The absence of a security provision, in my view, is an institutional deficiency that needs attention. Without it, issues of providing appropriate military representation at the level of the CARICOM Secretariat will not be raised and thus deprive the political decision makers of much needed staff advice as to the requirements of any CARICOM force that is to be committed to a mission. How far off is this arrangement is anybody’s guess as a most recent opportunity that afforded a possibility for co-ordination (the Ship-rider issue) was not utilized. Added to this is an apparent preference for bilateral arrangements by the hemispheric giant to deal with common issues.

Lessons Learnt

CARICOM women in peace support.

Any consideration of the future must draw on our past. In this regard there were four major lessons coming out of Haiti under the following headings

1. Command and control issues
2. Training
3. Logistics/Equipment and
4. Administration

When putting any structure in place there must be relationships which clearly define the chain of command. These relationships must be guided by the principle of unity of command which requires that a subordinate be answerable to only one superior. This principle was not followed in Haiti and it severely affected the battalion commanders capacity to exercise command and control of the unit.

On arrival at the staging area for deployment to Haiti, it was realized that the CARICOM battalion’s mission had not been defined. As well, not sufficient credit was given to the high level of preparedness of the troops to be deployed which resulted in non-CARICOM trainers approaching their tasks at very basic levels. Due deference must be paid to the skill and professionalism of our officers, Non-commissioned officers and soldiers. There were also many misunderstandings among the partners which at times hampered mission accomplishment.

United we stand – CARICOM Peacekeepers.

It is imperative that our training include an understanding of the roles of NCOs, Police and other agencies that will be encountered in theatre, and this training must be conducted in an atmosphere of mutual respect with home countries leading the way. CARICOM did not have the capacity to survive on its own in theatre. This became more evident when there was the shift from the MNF to UNMIH, and CARICOM became responsible for the provision of its own uniform, pay, etc.

In terms of equipment, the range of weapons alone makes the point. With seven countries participating, there were five different weapon systems. Administratively, a CARICOM battalion is a new entity and thus every opportunity needed to be provided to have it build cohesion and develop its own way of doing things and so remove the focus on individual countries. The fact that unit administration worked well for the most part is testimony to the professionalism and human relation skills of those who were on board. External links to home countries were, in some cases ineffective, sometimes non-existent.

The Future

Manning the Joint Operations Room in Guatemala.

Given the various interests involved, our level of military professionalism, our success in Haiti and the tremendous potential to lift the international standing and enhance the security of the region, I believe that CARICOM will continue to be involved in Peace Support Operations. The challenge for the future is how to make best use of the opportunities and strengths that come out of a regional approach to the issues whilst minimizing the impact of our deficiencies in finance, size and lack of experience in this sphere of activity. I would make the following specific recommendations to deal with the matters that have been raised:

That the CARICOM Treaty be amended to allow for collective defence to facilitate military staffing at the Secretariat. A senior staff officer of field rank serving a tour of duty of 12 to 18 months should be assigned in support of the political directorates and regional Chiefs of Staff. This military desk can co-ordinate any regional demand for resources.

That the community become involved in conflict resolution both intra and extra regionally so as to gain the respect and confidence of the international community.

That regional Defence Acts make provision for regional operations under a unified command and that Summary Jurisdiction Regulations be established to guide the disciplinary process. These regulations will determine among other things which offence will be dealt with in theatre and from whom a service person given punishment can seek redress as, ultimately, that person is subject to the laws of his or her own country.

A forum should also be created to allow senior officers who are likely to command, a chance to become familiar with this legislation.

That a standing battalion headquarters be set up with appointments rotated annually similar to what now exists with the CARICOM Disaster relief Unit. This will allow for the teething problems with processes, cohesion and culture to be addressed. The continuous existence of this HQ along with the staff of the Secretariat can establish Standard Operational Procedures, and can facilitate pre-deployment training. This HQ can be exercised annually as part of Exercise Tradewinds.

That one nation in the region initiate the establishment of a peacekeeping training school with the help of a donor or donor countries that have had lengthy and broad experience in the peacekeeping environment in a manner similar to the Jamaica Junior Command and Staff College. The school must establish formal relationship with the UN to access training material, evaluation standards and MTTs. There must also be a formal relationship between the school, the military staff at the Secretariat and the standing HQ to standardize doctrine/develop a regional concept and keep all activity in line with other international institutions. Similarly, that the Association of Caribbean States be used as a vehicle to gain from the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other emerging peacekeeping nations in South America, attachments and exchange of personnel to and from these institutions should be pursued. Government officials who are likely to be involved in the decision making process on peacekeeping should attend courses to become acquainted with the wider issues associated with these operations.

That to help gain experience and credibility officers be posted to the UN, ongoing mission HQs and commitments be made to UN standby arrangements.

That to the extent that it is possible, regional forces synchronize equipment purchases to derive standardization and economics, even though it is anticipated that there will be a reliance on donations from sponsor countries. Resource pooling must become Standard Operational Procedures.

That a formal arrangement be made with regional air transport carriers and telecommunication agencies to support troops in theatre.

Conclusion

A great opportunity awaits the region to advance its international standing through involvement in peace operations. Building on the region’s demonstrated ability to play an important role in peace operations, CARICOM Chiefs of Staff need to continue their efforts at building political support for the initiatives and the entire military community must commit itself to implement decisions and thus be able to march forward confidently into the future.