

# JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE



## STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

2006

*A Transformed JDF  
Enhancing Jamaica's Security*

## **Executive Summary**

Since 1962 the JDF has provided Jamaica with a multi-mission utility force that has enabled the government to respond to a range of security, development and civil contingencies. The new strategic security realities and the dynamic nature of the current threats have led to the 2005 National Security Strategy (NSS) which establishes Jamaica's holistic security framework. This served as a catalyst for the JDF to perform a critical assessment of itself through a Strategic Defence Review (SDR).

The SDR analyzed the capabilities of the JDF, during which a number of gaps became evident. The process led to the creation of a new mission and a series of tasks being identified, such that the JDF will be transformed to ensure best fit for the current and future requirements.

The transformation process includes the identification of appropriate capabilities to perform the new mission and tasks, adopting new approaches to transform the culture of the organization, as well as enabling the process through capital investments in equipment, critical infrastructure as well as human resources.

Some of the highlights of the SDR include the creation of a combat support battalion and a reserve engineer squadron. The establishment for the Air Wing and Coast Guard will be increased, and other areas that will realize enhanced capacity include a reorganized force headquarters, as well as the maritime surveillance and support components of the Force.

Critical to this transformation will be the implementation phase, which will involve a framework of fourteen new policies, a number of capital acquisitions, and some manpower, infrastructure and force structure rationalization. A number of processes will also have to be improved to realize further operational efficiencies. The transformed JDF will be modern, flexible and deliver new capabilities with increased operational effectiveness thereby positioning itself to meet the demands of the nation.

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## **Message from the Most Honourable Prime Minister and Minister of Defence**



We live in a changing world filled with uncertainty and risk, and Jamaica has its fair share of threats and security challenges both internal and external. The unfortunate recent events on the US Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina have underscored the importance of security, and of protecting citizens from a range of civil contingencies.

The National Security Strategy has outlined the overarching policies that will be used to address Jamaica's new security environment. Of course, the government employs a range of instruments to cope with these matters, and the Jamaica Defence Force provides us with one such instrument. The military option is an important safeguard for the ultimate sovereignty of our nation, as without security; there will be little or no development.

Jamaica must also play its role in contributing to the security and development of its global partners. Our security is important to us, the region and the international community, and in testimony to this, we received invaluable assistance from Canada, UK and US in conducting this important Strategic Defence Review.

Since its inception in 1962, the Jamaica Defence Force has earned the respect of international peers through its professionalism. This review will serve to transform the Jamaica Defence Force into a modern military force that is responsive and relevant to the needs of the nation. I am confident that Jamaica will reap the benefits of the new capability-based Jamaica Defence Force.

*(Signature)*

Most Honourable Percival J Patterson ON, PC, QC, MP  
Prime Minister of Jamaica

February 2006

## **Foreword by the Honourable Minister of National Security**



The 2005 National Security Strategy sets the master plan for the security of our nation whilst the Strategic Defence Review is the roadmap for the military contribution to that plan. The maintenance of a military force is an important insurance policy against the greatest threats to our sovereignty and viability as a nation. The fact that this has not occurred to date does not mean that we should cancel our insurance policy.

Whereas the JCF is the principal law enforcement agency in Jamaica, there are times when the military's involvement is required, such as when matters escalate to certain levels of violence beyond the capabilities of normal policing. In order to meet our security challenges, it is important that we define roles for the military appropriate to our Jamaican context, and this must be done with a short to medium term outlook.

Our fiscal constraints dictate that we optimize our national security resources, meaning that we need more efficient and flexible forces. Whether it be search and rescue, maritime surveillance, internal security, counter-narcotics or counter terrorism operations, our pilots, technical specialists and infantrymen, must continue to do what they do, but even more efficiently. Certain resource issues will have to be addressed in order for the new capabilities to be achieved, but these will be consistent with the priorities of the nation.

The streamlined JDF structure and new capabilities will allow us to respond to a range of situations, some of which we have seen before, others we hope not to, but must stand ready should the unthinkable happen. The professionalism of the Jamaica Defence Force will add much value to the security landscape in Jamaica.

*(signature)*

Honourable Dr Peter Phillips, PhD MP  
Minister of National Security

February 2006

## Introduction by the Chief of Staff



This Strategic Defence Review is the first of its kind to be undertaken by the Jamaica Defence Force, and this fundamental exercise is being done in an era when the relevance of a standing military force has been called into question. Though the JDF has evolved since its inception in response to a series of changes in the security landscape, the time has come to look at the JDF in totality. Traditionally, we have based our military on the threats that existed. However, this meant that we would always be maintaining military forces based on yesterday's threats, and if these threats were no longer perceived, our relevance could be called into question. The current thrust is to develop capability-based forces, such that they can maintain their relevance in any new security environment. Our vision is to maintain a *'high quality professional Defence Force, that is valued by the Nation, a Defence Force that is ready and capable of conducting a range of operations to protect our national interests and the well being of our citizens'*.

In order for this to be realised, the Jamaica Defence Force will be transformed into a flexible, capability-based force that will allow for improved interoperability, and more focus on joint operations. Some of the features of the transformed JDF will be an enhanced policy framework, an updated command and control system, a specially trained unit capable of combating the terrorist dimension as well as a maritime surveillance capability to combat the illegal activities taking place within our maritime areas of jurisdiction.

The transformation will also involve investing in our most valuable resource and the source of our strength, the men and women of the JDF. They will of course require the right tools to do the job, and as such it will also involve a number of acquisitions and infrastructure upgrades in order to achieve the new capabilities. We will also acquire enhanced capacities for training and more efficient logistic processes.

This review was conducted through many consultations, whilst maintaining firm grounding in military principles and our experience. Many thanks to our Joint Advisory Team comprising our military partners in the Canada, UK, US and who offered advice on some of the dynamic and complex issues that arose. A transformed Jamaica Defence Force will result in Jamaica having a modern military with the capability to secure its borders, assist and protect Jamaicans in times of crisis or disaster and play a major role in contributing to peace and stability in the region.

*(signature)*

Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin CD, ADC, MBA, JP, psc (N)  
Chief of Staff

February 2006

## Glossary of Terms

ADC – Aide de Camp  
CDS – Chief of Defence Staff  
CJCSC – Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College  
COS – Chief of Staff  
CO – Commanding Officer  
CSME – Caribbean Single Market and Economy  
DCDS – Deputy Chief of Defence Staff  
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone  
EOD/IEDD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal  
EPC - Equipment Procurement Committee  
OIBUA – Operations In Built Up Areas  
FMO – Force Medical Officer  
FCO – Force Communications Officer  
FDO – Force Dental Officer  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
HQ JDF – Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force  
HR – Human Resource  
IG – Inspector General  
IPV – Inshore Patrol Vessel  
ISC – Information Systems Centre  
J(1-9) designates various departments on the joint staff of HQ JDF  
JCF – Jamaica Constabulary Force  
JDF - Jamaica Defence Force  
JDF AW – Jamaica Defence Force Air Wing  
JDF CG - Jamaica Defence Force Coast Guard  
JDF SD - Jamaica Defence Force Supply Depot  
JDF TU – Jamaica Defence Force Transport Unit  
MNS – Ministry of National Security  
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding  
MPA – Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
MRS – Medical Reception Station  
NBCD – Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Detection  
NCC – National Contracts Commission  
NSS – National Security Strategy  
OC – Officer Commanding  
ODPEM – Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management  
OPV – Offshore Patrol Vessel  
PAJ - Port Authority of Jamaica  
PFI – Private Finance Initiative  
QM – Quartermaster  
SAR - Search and Rescue  
SDR – Strategic Defence Review  
SEMEO – Senior Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Officer

SO – Staff Officer

SSG – Strategic Security Goal

UK – United Kingdom

US – United States of America

1 Engr Regt (JDF) - 1 Engineer Regiment (Jamaica Defence Force)

1JR – First Battalion the Jamaica Regiment

2JR – Second Battalion the Jamaica Regiment

3JR (NR) – Third Battalion the Jamaica Regiment (National Reserve)

# Chapter 1

## THE JDF – SERVING JAMAICA

### **Military forces and their purpose**

*‘Members of Armed Forces are subject to direct governmental authority, and have skills and equipment that enable governments to respond to challenges, both in their own countries and elsewhere, that<sup>1</sup> could not otherwise be addressed so promptly.’<sup>1</sup>*

1. Every government has at its disposal a series of diplomatic, military and economic instruments used to pursue their national and international interests. Nations retain the right to defend themselves from external aggression and to maintain social order as they seek to realize their goals. A professional military force under civil control is a major asset and insurance policy for any country, and remains an important component of sovereignty.

2. In the modern era, military forces have taken on a range of non-traditional missions such as:

- Internal security
- Disaster relief
- Participation in nation building
- International peacekeeping and peace enforcement

### **The Jamaica Defence Force**

3. The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) was formed on 31<sup>st</sup> July 1962, a few days before Jamaica gained its independence from the United Kingdom (UK). Jamaica was the first British colony in the Caribbean to become an independent state within the Commonwealth of Nations. With the British forces withdrawing, Jamaica was compelled to fill the security vacuum by establishing a Defence Force. This led to the

drafting of the Defence Act (1962) to govern the actions of and procedures within the JDF.

4. Section four (4) of the Defence Act (1962) states:

*‘there shall be established in Jamaica a body of Her Majesty’s military forces to be called the Jamaica Defence Force, and shall consist of a regular force and a reserve force to be known as the Jamaica National Reserve’.*

In addition, the Defence Act charges the JDF with ‘the defence of and maintenance of order in Jamaica, and with such other duties as may from time to time be defined by the Defence Board’. According to the Act, the Force may also be employed outside Jamaica, as has been done on several occasions.

5. The JDF was conceived as an infantry force and shortly thereafter maritime and air elements were added. The environment changed throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, resulting in the maritime and air elements developing to the point that they became autonomous units. As the internal security landscape unfolded in the late 1970’s a second infantry battalion was added. A construction squadron originally formed for national projects later evolved into 1 Engineer Regiment (JDF).

6. The JDF has an adaptable and multi-mission utility that complements other government agencies. It is an organization which requires of its members, unlimited liability involving personal hardship, loss of certain liberties, discomfort and sometimes injury or death. The military cannot avoid risk, but confronts and manages it. A paramilitary or civil police force is not designed to cope with conflict or violence beyond the point that requires military intervention. Furthermore, the JDF provides Jamaica with a disciplined, professional and stable body, loyal to the people and State of Jamaica.

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<sup>1</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmaments, and International Security.

## **The need for a Defence Review**

7. In 2005 the Government of Jamaica approved a National Security Strategy (NSS) for Jamaica entitled “Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation”. This NSS integrates Jamaica’s major security policies, goals, responsibilities, and actions into a cohesive whole. Through the NSS, the Government has adopted a holistic approach to security, recognizing the various non-military dimensions of security and the distinction between the security of the state and the security of the people. It classifies the institutional framework within which the JDF and civil institutions of the State will coordinate their activities to create an integrated and cohesive national security network to safeguard Jamaica’s interests.

8. The NSS mandates the JDF to conduct a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review (SDR) that elaborates on how the military will contribute to the overall security policy objectives of the Government of Jamaica. The dynamic nature of the current threats has also highlighted a number of capability gaps in the JDF as it is presently structured and resourced. A comprehensive review of the JDF was therefore unavoidable. With a global trend towards capability-based forces as opposed to threat-based forces, a review should identify areas where greater efficiency, effectiveness and relevance can be realized. Whilst it is important to examine all options, it is also critical that the review remains grounded in sound military principles and experience. The review addressed a range of issues such as how the JDF’s mission, tasks, capabilities and shape should be adjusted to meet the new strategic security realities.

## Chapter 2

### THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

#### Global

9. The strategic context in which the defence review was conducted is one with increased globalisation and almost instantaneous transfer of information around the world. The impact of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City immediately echoed around the world and has impacted on the Caribbean Basin and in particular, Jamaica. An immediate and understandable shift of United States (US) resources was made in order to protect their mainland. Terrorism became the main threat, a fact which was rapidly taken on board by other countries as bombings took place in other areas including London (England) and Port of Spain (Trinidad). This highlighted the vulnerability of countries, such as Jamaica, which rely on tourism. Armed Forces sought to reorient themselves to deal with threats that were less likely to be directly confrontational, but were more asymmetric in character.

#### Regional

10. At the regional level, various issues impact on Jamaica's security policies. There are risks associated with the continued political and economic instability in Haiti. This chronic unstable situation more easily facilitates the illegal arms and narcotics trade. The instability can also lead to recurrences of breakdown in law and order beyond the capability of the Haitian security apparatus. Such potentially anarchical circumstances could see criminal elements seeking to take advantage of the situation and escalating their activities. That situation will almost certainly see a resurgence of Haitian refugees and the accompanying demand for accommodation and health services. Given our close proximity, Jamaica will have no choice but to carefully monitor the state of affairs as it develops in Haiti and ensure that the requisite contingencies are in place.

11. Other geographical realities, such as our position between Central/South and North America, mean that our island continues to be lucrative as a transshipment point not only for arms and drugs trafficking, but for illegal immigration and human trafficking as

well. Furthermore, with the implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), security challenges will arise regarding the uninhibited movement of people and goods. This undeniable reality means that the regional dimension will shortly take on added urgency and importance. Whilst we screen and assist those in need of help, we must at the same time make certain that we send a clear message that Jamaica is not open for any form of illegal trafficking, be it in commodities or persons.

## **Jamaica's Environment**

12. Locally, the circumstances giving rise to crime and violence have become more complex and acute. Drug trafficking, unprecedented levels of extortion, gang and domestic violence are undermining the socio-economic fabric of the society. In addition, the influence of deportees and foreign nationals on local criminal networks has resulted in these becoming more structured and sophisticated in their operations. The recent cases of piracy further illustrate the need for a force that can rapidly refocus to deal with emerging threats. These enclaves of criminality can pose serious challenges to the State. There are therefore greater demands on the organs of the State with responsibility for security to re-examine their roles. Military involvement in internal security, through assistance to the police; the management of disasters; maritime resources management; and the execution of specific projects in support of national development have long been accepted as necessary.

## **NSS Mandates**

13. The NSS analysis of the strategic environment and threats to National Security has identified the need for Jamaica to maintain a defence capacity to deter, and counter or defeat traditional military threats. It further identified eight Strategic Security Goals (SSGs) and two cross-cutting issues which affect all the goals as outlined below. Those goals which require direct JDF involvement are highlighted.

## SSGs

- **Goal 1 - To reduce violent crime and dismantle organized criminal networks.<sup>2</sup>**
- **Goal 2 - To strengthen the criminal justice system and promote respect for the rule of law.**
- **Goal 3 - To protect Jamaica from terrorism.**
- **Goal 4 - To protect and control Jamaica's territory.**
- **Goal 5 - To strengthen the integrity of institutions of democratic government.**
- **Goal 6 - To increase Jamaica's contribution to regional and international security.**
- **Goal 7 - To provide the environment for a stable economy and effective delivery of social services.**
- **Goal 8 - To protect Jamaica's natural resources and reduce the risks of disasters.<sup>3</sup>**

## Cross-cutting Issues

- Effective analysis and use of intelligence.
- Public education and awareness.

## JDF Responsibilities

14. The JDF responsibilities, mandated by the Defence Act and the NSS, are as shown below:

- a. Defend Jamaica against military or paramilitary threats.
- b. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (this may be for emergencies or a standing commitment). Specific detailed support tasks include, but are not restricted to

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<sup>2</sup> The JDF's role in this respect is to assist the Jamaica Constabulary Force which has primacy.

<sup>3</sup> The JDF operates in conjunction with other Government Bodies to achieve this goal. Generally the JDF supports those Government Bodies with its unique capacities as in the case of ODPEM and the Fisheries Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.

1. Restoration/maintenance of law and order
2. Counter-narcotics
3. Search and Rescue (SAR)
4. Casualty evacuation
5. Humanitarian and disaster relief
6. Defence diplomacy
7. Nation building projects
8. Contingency planning
9. State ceremonial duties

c. Monitoring the integrity of Jamaica's waters and airspace by demonstrating sovereignty over the territorial space and protecting the rights and interests in the maritime and aeronautical areas of jurisdiction (including marine environmental and fisheries protection).

d. Counter Terrorism operations by monitoring and analysing potential terrorist activities, and preventing or responding to terrorist incidents, including Nuclear Biological Chemical Detection (NBCD) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (EOD/IEDD).

### **The JDF's Mission and Tasks**

15. The JDF's *raison d'être* is that of defence against external and internal aggressors. However, the global environment has brought about a requirement for flexible and responsive military forces directly involved in internal security and civil defence roles. From the SSGs and cross-cutting issues identified by the NSS, and some long-standing traditional tasks, the JDF has identified a single defence mission:

***'To provide military capability to deter and/ or defeat threats against the Jamaican State and/or its interests.'***

16. In order to execute this mission, the following tasks were derived:

- a. **Defend against external aggressors**
- b. **Internal Security**
- c. **Disaster Relief**
- d. **Support to other government agencies and departments**
- e. **Monitoring and control of airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction**
- f. **Counter Terrorism**
- g. **Search and Rescue**
- h. **Peace Support**
- i. **Regional Cooperation**
- j. **State Ceremonial Duties**

These tasks formed the basis for determining the policy framework and the capabilities required by the JDF to successfully carry out its mandate. It is the multi-task utility inherent in the JDF as a military organisation that gives it the flexibility for such varied and diverse employment.

17. The SDR will therefore look at the JDF and measure it against the requirements of the current environment and threats as outlined/defined by the NSS. The aim is to transform the JDF to ensure the best fit for current and future requirements. There are three aspects of transformation:

- a. The identification of appropriate capabilities – specific capabilities to meet the tasks and in a broad sense, identify the resources required for enhanced capabilities.
- b. Organisational and cultural transformation – the changes in organizational thinking/approaches and policies required to ensure sustainability and efficiency in delivering the capabilities.
- c. Enabling the transformation – the investment in human capital, equipment and infrastructure required to achieve the necessary transformation.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Identifying Capabilities for Transformation**

18. The JDF will be structured, equipped and trained to provide a core defence capability to fulfil its mission. The force design will be capability-based and flexible to allow for elements of the component parts of the JDF to be packaged into fighting units to respond to a wide range of defence and security contingencies. The JDF's skills, personnel and resources will continue to be utilized for other tasks in support of the civil authority when not engaged in its primary task of defence, internal security tasks beyond normal policing and major disasters. However, the JDF will have to ensure that its involvement in these other tasks does not degrade its capacity to deliver its core combat capability. It must therefore be able to prepare its forces continuously through high levels of individual and collective training and develop effective support capabilities.

19. A capability is the ability to accomplish a task, and is derived from the combination of military assets/equipment, manpower and training applied through a structure with a robust command and control mechanism. The full military capability of the JDF is a combination of the capabilities provided by the main combat units and appropriate support units. The capabilities required for each of the JDF tasks are covered in the remainder of this chapter. It must be noted that there are a number of support resources that are common to all of the tasks, the absence of which will significantly degrade the sustainability of the capabilities.

#### **Task 1 - Defend against external aggressors**

20. In order for the JDF to effectively protect Jamaica's sovereignty, it must have the capability to detect, identify and respond to enemy threats against Jamaica. A combination of land, maritime, and air forces will conduct defensive operations against any military threat. There is a requirement for bilateral or multilateral agreements with partner nations to support the JDF in the event of a protracted conflict. This will require a minimum of a reorganized and re-equipped brigade group comprised of air, maritime, and land forces along with the requisite intelligence support.

21. The JDF currently consists of a brigade with supporting elements, but there are gaps in the current configuration and resources that affect the ability of the JDF to properly fulfil this task. Re-capitalization of equipment and infrastructure used in other tasks such as armoured vehicles, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), base facilities and a flexible communications suite will improve the ability of the JDF to defend against any potential external aggressors.

### **Task 2 - Internal Security Operations**

22. The JDF is required to have the capability to detect, identify and combat insurgencies and/or internal security threats in support of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Although the JDF currently supports the JCF on a continuous basis, this assistance is limited due to the shortfall in resources. In order to effectively meet current commitments, each regular infantry battalion will need an increase of one company. Additionally, the JDF will need enough medium lift helicopters to rapidly move at least a platoon to any location islandwide and a fleet of vehicles capable of moving two companies. The Force also requires armoured vehicles for force protection, patrol vehicles, surveillance helicopters for airborne law enforcement, and a comprehensive communications system. A number of these assets already exist and are used in this role but some re-capitalisation is required.

### **Task 3 - Disaster Relief Operations**

23. The JDF needs the capability to mount post disaster relief (logistics management and rescue), recovery and reconstruction operations. The task of disaster management will be done with infantry and air assets previously identified along with engineering equipment and logistics trained personnel. However, the reserve element of the air and maritime units will have to be increased and a reserve squadron of engineers formed to augment the regular force. The acquisition of engineering equipment will provide additional assets to enable the Force to work along with other agencies in post disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction.

#### **Task 4 – Support to other Government Agencies and Departments**

24. To fulfil this task, the JDF requires the capability to provide air medical services, manage and maintain essential services in an emergency, and give advice on as well as participate in construction projects. The resources required to achieve this capability are primarily air, maritime and engineer assets similar to those identified for the previous tasks. The necessity for an even more robust engineering capacity is evident in the demands for assistance which presently exceed the capacity. The ever increasing demands on the JDF for its human capital on national projects and programmes will require an increase in manpower, and in its training capacity.

#### **Task 5 – Monitoring and Control of Airspace and Maritime areas of Jurisdiction.**

25. The JDF is required to have air and maritime capability to detect and identify aircraft and vessels within Jamaica's airspace and maritime areas on a 24 hour basis, interdict vessels involved in illegal activities and refugee movement, respond to oil/chemical spills, and undertake environmental and resource protection tasks. Based on Jamaica's approximately 275,000 km<sup>2</sup> maritime area, the resources required to give this capability will include maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), OPVs and inshore patrol vessels (IPV). At the moment, the JDF has limited capacity to conduct this task, particularly in the area of aerial surveillance which can now only be done by day and without the aid of critical electronic surveillance devices. Increases in manpower, and infrastructure upgrades (hangers and berthing facilities) are required for both the JDF Air Wing (JDF AW) and JDF Coast Guard (JDF CG).

#### **Task 6 - Counter Terrorism Operations**

26. The JDF requires a capability to respond to terrorist threats including hijackings, improvised explosive and explosive ordnance devices, and attacks on key installations. The resources for this capability include specially trained troops, properly equipped EOD/IEDD teams, as well as the infantry and intelligence forces used for the internal security task.

### **Task 7 - Search and Rescue**

27. The JDF requires the capability to search for, locate and rescue persons, aircraft and vessels in distress within Jamaica's SAR Region. In order to carry out this task, the JDF will require maritime patrol aircraft, medium lift helicopters and inshore and offshore patrol vessels as previously identified to effect rescue missions at sea. For land rescue missions, specifically trained and equipped infantry units will enable this task to be conducted effectively.

### **Task 8 - Peace Support Operations**

28. This task involves the JDF rendering external humanitarian assistance and participating in peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations regionally and internationally. The JDF should be able to package its forces with the requisite equipment for deployment on a wide range of missions. This task will require the JDF to have access to some level of regional lift, in order to move the requisite infantry and/or engineer units to and from the area of operation. This regional lift may be air or maritime in nature, and could be provided by a platform similar to the MPA, or the OPVs from our other tasks. Jamaica should have the capability to assist our regional partners in the event of such contingencies, much as we would expect them to help us under similar circumstances.

### **Task 9 - Regional Cooperation**

29. The JDF will have the capability to participate in regional training and exchange exercises, in order to maintain interoperability with our partner nations, and liaise with regional and international partners on security matters, including security related MOUs and treaties. There is also a need for the development of protocols with our partners to deal with common challenges including refugees and human trafficking. The requirement for this task is mainly human resource related and will come from existing resources. There is also value in examining some common equipment procurement programmes, thus making interoperability easier while opening opportunities to realise economies of scale.

### **Task 10 - State Ceremonial Duties**

30. The JDF has responsibility to provide troops for state ceremonial functions including guards of honour and state funerals. The main resource required for this important task is infantry manpower which places a strain on the level of resources that are available for internal security tasks. The JDF will also have to maintain its military band which has continued to chart a proud tradition for Jamaica and the JDF.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Command and Control**

31. The JDF's command and control structure must be so configured to ensure proper emphasis on resource management to make the organisation function effectively. Efforts will be made to bring our headquarters generally in line with the designation and military structures maintained by partner nations. In redesigning this command and control structure, consideration must be given to the relatively small size of the force, its relationships with external organisations, its specialist skill set and its management of strategic, operational and tactical issues.

32. At the strategic level the headquarters needs to be able to provide ministerial advice and examine policies for ratification by the Defence Board, set capital expenditure priorities, and conduct long term planning and reviews. This function will be enhanced in the redesigned force headquarters.

33. The operational matters, which will generally demand most of the capacity of the headquarters, have a broader range of functions than the strategic level. At the operational level there must be increased capacity for contingency planning, human resource management, finance and logistics management, developing training directives, and giving operational direction. The capacity will be built through assigning appropriate numbers and levels of staff that have the requisite training and experience. The lines of responsibility will need clarification and the processes synchronised.

34. At the tactical/unit level the main areas identified for development are those of resource management, operational planning and special projects. This may require additional and more qualified support staff that will be more capable of coordinating with the higher headquarters and operating in a joint role with external agencies such as the JCF.


35. The structure of the force headquarters must be robust enough to deal with current operations and at the same time continue to plan for the future. It must be able to formulate policies and position the organisation to fulfil its roles. An examination of the headquarters' posts and the process for selection and preparation of personnel for particular appointments is required. The headquarters currently deals with strategic, operational and tactical matters but the review has shown that the operational and tactical demands stretch its existing capacity thereby leaving very little for strategic planning.

36. Command and control of the JDF is the purview of the Chief of Staff (COS) exercised through the Headquarters of the JDF (HQ JDF). The competing demands on the COS to deal with strategic and operational level matters creates a necessary split in his attention as generally the strategic issues should take precedence. It indicates a need for the COS to have command assistance for routine operational matters. A defence board submission will be made with respect to the detailed composition of the headquarters. Generally, any such Defence Board submission will include a Deputy Chief of Staff who assists with command and a senior staff officer who coordinates the headquarters staff. The headquarters will be divided into the following branches headed by principal staff officers:

- a. Personnel Administration (J1)
- b. Intelligence and Operations (J2/J3)
- c. Finance and Logistics (J4)
- d. Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5)
- e. Communications/MIS (J6)
- f. Training and Doctrine (J7)
- g. Legal/Civil-Military Affairs (J8/J9)

The line units that will report directly to HQ JDF are shown in figure 1 below.

**Figure 1**



37. Apart from the personnel and structural changes to the headquarters, the development of the physical infrastructure from which operations can be planned and managed is necessary. This facility will require appropriate technology to receive and process operational information which will enable better intra and inter agency co-ordination and serve to enhance the effectiveness of our joint operations.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Organisational and Cultural Change**

#### **Human Resources**

38. Traditionally, the main strength of the JDF has been its human capital base, and in particular the quality leadership provided at all levels. Emphasis will be placed on infusing the best talents throughout the command structure of the Force. A transparent career planning policy which embraces and rewards ability and competence must be further developed which will play a significant role in the reorientation and transformation of the organization. To retain experience and knowledge within the organisation, emphasis will be placed on quality of life issues including increased educational opportunities, health care, accommodation and remuneration.

39. The medical well-being of our soldiers must be given priority if they are to deliver the quality service expected by the nation. Our patient management policies will be re-examined thus allowing us to return soldiers to frontline duties more quickly. A more empirical approach to the procurement of medical goods and services through the implementation of appropriate health management software will be developed. Measures which allow us to better identify high demand services which can then be delivered through an enhanced internal capability will be implemented.

40. A revised accommodation policy more consistent with modern standards will be developed. This policy will determine how personnel are accommodated, who will be accommodated and how they are accommodated. It will also inform the priorities for re-capitalization and determine the physical layout. Modern estate management practices will also be implemented to ensure longevity and quality assurance.

41. A policy framework that addresses rank differentials, which rewards increased responsibility with increased remunerations, will be developed. A look at alternate forms of benefits and incentives such as housing access and educational grants will also be included. A programme to implement re-enlistment bonuses will be investigated as a means of encouraging the retention of highly skilled personnel.

42. These fundamental issues must be addressed in a meaningful manner in order to ensure that the soldiers remain motivated, committed and capable of achieving the highest professional standards.

### **Education and Training**

43. Education and training are key components of military effectiveness which bring together human and material resources. The broad areas of training considered in the context of the SDR are those concerned with increasing the force's effectiveness in joint and combined operations, the sustainability of training opportunities, and the doctrine and policies that will drive it.

44. Education will be emphasised as being integral to the long term well-being of the individual service personnel. To this end, it is expected that education levels will have to match the level of responsibilities. As an example, unit commanders and senior staff should ideally have a Masters Degree. An education policy that seeks to create a consistent, comprehensive and easily accessible programme will deliver a more flexible and informed workforce. Personnel will be encouraged throughout their service to take advantage of the educational opportunities which will enhance their value to the JDF and will also allow for easier re-integration into civil society.

45. Lower level training is done locally whilst more advanced to specialist training is usually done overseas. This overseas training is either purchased or received through grants from our traditional partners. As the traditional partners engage a wider cross section of nations, the available funding and training opportunities for Jamaica will diminish. The strategic direction for training and the policy framework will seek to address these changes by ensuring that our ability to deliver training is sustainable.

46. The diversification of our training options and the development of relationships with non-traditional military partners will allow continued access to critical training. The ongoing collaboration with regional military partners will be strengthened, as each

country develops its area of expertise, which all can access. The JDF will develop partnerships with local and international educational institutions as well as with industry to build internal capacity. The existing Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College (CJCSC) will continue, and plans are in place for an artisan training school. A more cost effective and sustainable solution for the generation of aircrew and aircraft technicians is required and to this end a local training institution is one option being explored.

47. The focus for individual training will be on developing and maintaining specific standards that are geared towards producing mission oriented and combat ready soldiers. Collective training will be designed to allow the packaging of forces for specific operations both locally, regionally and internationally. The current emphasis on police/military operations necessitates increased joint training with the JCF. This will have to be augmented by more intelligence sharing, the establishment of closer liaison and compatible communications systems.

48. As we seek to develop new capabilities and re-examine some of our traditional methods of operation, the doctrine that emerges will be the driver for future training. The training thrust will be geared towards getting the individual soldier more proficient in a number of disciplines thereby making him more adaptable. The application of modern technology in training will result in cost savings in the long-term whilst delivering flexible, responsive and interactive solutions.

49. To ensure the sustainability of the capabilities, our *modus operandi* requires a more modern and informed approach. Some of the areas that will have to be examined include interaction with other agencies, acquisition policies, maintenance procedures and other efficiency measures.

### **Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination**

50. The JCF which is the primary law enforcement organization in Jamaica has launched their Corporate Strategy 2005 – 2008 that sets out their security priorities and strategies. Given the high levels of crime, the JDF has been deployed to assist them in

the maintenance of law and order. Such assistance to the JCF will continue for as long as it is considered necessary and such employment is authorized under Section nine (9) of the Defence Act. Furthermore, the NSS clearly outlines in goal five (5) objective one that *'protocol should be established governing cooperation between agencies with similar or overlapping responsibilities particularly the JDF and JCF ensuring the clear indication of lead roles'*. The JDF and JCF will participate in the establishment of a protocol covering amongst other things:

- a. Indication of lead roles
- b. Delimitation of levels of JDF assistance to the JCF
- c. Response to terrorist threats and responsibilities
- d. Delimitation of responsibility for Jamaica's maritime space

51. The JDF will also seek to establish Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with other agencies such as the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM), the Ministry of Health (MOH), and the Port Authority of Jamaica (PAJ). These MOU will serve to facilitate better liaison and more effective operations under difficult circumstances or crisis situations. The principle of reciprocity will be applied under these MOU.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Enabling Transformation**


#### **Equipment and Infrastructure Capital Investment**

52. Whilst the Jamaica Defence Force remains aware of the current financial constraints facing the country, the resource gaps will have consequences on our national security and by extension the country's economic stability and social well being. Filling the gaps that impact on immediate threats will form the basis for priority acquisitions.


53. In financial year 2004/2005 Jamaica spent 0.69% of GDP on the JDF which translates to 0.92% of the national budget. Military aid from Canada, UK and the US adds significantly to our current capability levels, essentially meaning that Jamaica does not bear the true economic cost of having a military capability. In fact, foreign military aid was approximately J\$300 million over that period, which equates to 10% of the overall defence budget and 47% of the working budget after the salaries component is extracted. It is anticipated that there will be continued assistance from existing and emerging international partners. With the capital expenditure required to achieve the new capabilities, measures will have to be put in place to ensure that complete solutions are delivered, and value for money realized.

54. The proposed JDF capital requirement is outlined in figure 2 and which compares the time at which contracts would be signed versus actual expenditure. Figure 3 outlines the total capital that would be required to deliver the enhanced capabilities. Parts of this expenditure would have to be financed through international loans and export development fund assistance to reduce the necessary burden on Jamaica's economy.

**Figure 2**



**Figure 3**



55. There has always been a great demand from both public and private sector entities for assistance from the JDF, especially for the provision of manpower and equipment. A cost is incurred in rendering these services and this is often not recovered. On the contrary, the JDF has to pay these said entities for their service to the organization. Modern government accounting requires that ministries raise charges against each other for services rendered. The ongoing public sector modernisation programme and the fiscal reality suggest that the time has come for the JDF to recover the economic cost of these activities, since in most instances, there is no special budgetary allocation for this. The JDF will continue to examine ways in which extra-budgetary resources can be made available, whether through cost recovery or mutually beneficial partnerships on development projects and activities.

56. In order to achieve some of the new or enhanced capabilities, a number of capital acquisitions have already been identified. A more holistic approach to acquisition will be adopted in order to increase the service life of capital equipment, and create an environment for more efficient planning and accountability. Some of the key features of the proposed acquisitions are as follows:

- Turn-key packages for each capability
- Life cycle management programs (finite in-service targets, in-service upgrades, maintenance programs and service life extensions)
- 100% financing (through multi-lateral financial institutions) including a look at the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and other forms of risk sharing partnerships
- Prime contracting (particularly for the air, maritime, and engineer capabilities)
- A five (5) year minimum spares, training and infrastructure support package
- Maximized warranty support
- Use of competitive international tendering to achieve best value for money, including the examination of the use of defence offsets
- Continued utilization of military assistance packages

57. There are other measures that will be taken by the JDF to further optimise the levels of efficiency. These include:

- Consolidation of dining and recreational facilities in Up Park Camp
- Outsourcing of some activities – pass on or share the risk associated with the delivery of non-core services
- Consolidation of cost centres for more efficient management
- The computerization of processes to make more empirical data available for better decision making
- Use of civilian employees in non combat roles (such as in Messes and stores)
- Consolidation of logistic functions to reduce duplication of effort
- A programme of preventative maintenance for equipment and infrastructure

58. As stated earlier the overarching policy for force design is to provide forces that can be packaged for particular missions. The restructuring where necessary, should also realise the more efficient delivery of support and services. All of this will be managed through a more flexible command and control structure.

## **Human Resources**

59. In light of the current manpower gap of eight hundred officers and enlisted personnel, increases to the establishment of the regular force are envisaged in a number of areas. The majority of the increase is earmarked for the Coast Guard and Air Wing to meet the requirements of the new platforms. However, this will not require significant manning changes immediately as the initial increase for the Coast Guard and Air Wing will be met from existing posts elsewhere in the Force. It is estimated that an increase of approximately 4.5 % per annum for the next five years will address the remainder of the shortfall.

60. Increased internal security operations and the need to counter terrorist threats have indicated the requirement for an additional company in each of the infantry

battalions, the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Unit and the development of an enhanced intelligence capacity. In addition, a number of existing units and departments will be restructured to make them more effective. Restructuring the support and administrative functions will allow for better support of the frontline capabilities through consolidation and centralisation of some services as well as the creation of more manageable cost centres.

61. An enhanced capacity to recruit based on a revised policy will allow for continual recruiting and assessment in order to target individuals who can be trained to handle the demands of military service. The main thrusts for recruiting are:

- a. Improved recruiting programmes delivered by a larger dedicated staff
- b. Re-examination of entry requirements
- c. Increased accessibility to recruiting centres for the public

### **Reserve Forces**

62. An increased reserve force allows us to ramp up to important tasks not performed often enough to justify standing forces. Presently, many reserve personnel are on extended periods of call out in support of routine operations and for the manning of outstations and as such, are not serving as reserves in the strict sense of the word. This creates difficulties with terms of service where reserves perform the same duties as regular service personnel but are not entitled to similar compensation. Furthermore, the service of soldiers who have served in the reserve force is not considered reckonable if they transfer to the regular force. A special submission will be made to treat with reservists who have been on continuous callout with respect to pensions and gratuities. The proposal is for the reserves to return to their traditional role and for the standing tasks to be done by regular forces. It is further proposed that the Reserve Council be reactivated and operate as provided for by the Defence Act.

63. The thrust is for more closely integrated reserve elements with their related frontline units and to this end, the establishment and/or expansion of the reserve

components of the Engineer Regiment, the Air Wing, and the Coast Guard is proposed. An increase of one hundred and thirty-five officers and enlisted personnel to the Air Wing and Coast Guard reserves and the establishment of a reserve engineer squadron of one hundred and ninety-two officers and enlisted personnel will be required.

## **Civilian Employees**

64. Civilian employees play an integral role in providing services throughout the supporting units of the force. They provide continuity when soldiers need to be temporarily reassigned to meet immediate needs elsewhere. Within the framework of set government wage guidelines, the organisation will seek to implement non pay related incentive programmes to motivate the civilian workforce. In light of this, a greater number of civilians are getting access to specific job related training alongside their military counterparts. The integration achieved through shared training also fosters better relations between military and civilian staff enhancing overall effectiveness.

## **Transforming Capabilities**

65. As a part of the transformation strategy, the JDF will focus on the following main programs:

With respect to Command and Control, the JDF will:

- Enhance the strategic function within the existing headquarters.
- Restructure the force headquarters.
- Adopt appropriate information technology for better operational efficiency. This will require reorganisation and reallocation of existing resources.
- Construct a modern operations centre.

With respect to the capabilities of the Air Wing, the JDF will:

- Replace the existing four (4) Eurocopter AS355N surveillance and utility helicopters through an exchange programme
- Acquire one (1) additional Bell 412EP helicopter, and refurbish the existing three
- Construct a new integrated hangar facility
- Acquire two (2) Maritime Patrol Aircraft
- Open a local aircrew training facility
- Expand the reserve flight, to include the incorporation of aircraft maintenance staff.

With respect to the Coast Guard, the JDF will:

- Refurbish and bring into service two of the currently held OPVs
- Take delivery of three new OPVs.
- Continue the refurbishing of the seven currently held IPVs.
- Acquire twelve new IPVs
- Construct new berthing and marine workshop facilities
- Expand the reserve component

With respect to the Engineer Regiment capabilities, the JDF will:

- Acquire new engineer equipment
- Continue the development of an artisan training school
- Establish a reserve Squadron

With respect to the infantry capabilities, the JDF will:

- Acquire twenty nine (29) patrol vehicles
- Acquire twenty (20) troop carrying vehicles
- Acquire a new communications system
- Refurbish and build accommodation for two infantry battalions in Up Park Camp
- Construct an urban (OIBUA) joint training complex
- Refurbish the existing fourteen (14) armoured cars
- Acquire six (6) new armoured cars
- Acquire appropriate specialist weapons

With respect to Service Support capabilities, the JDF will:

- Acquire and upgrade specialist EOD/IEDD equipment
- Acquire vehicle diagnostic and maintenance equipment
- Establish a centralised quartermaster store.
- Acquire refrigerated vehicles
- Establish a medical company,
- Acquire health management software.
- Implement a HR software package
- Consolidate dining and messing facilities in Up Park Camp
- Merge the military records and pay departments.

With respect to combat support and training the JDF will:

- Establish a Combat Support Battalion
- Create an establishment for CJCSC
- Relocate special forces and the Training Depot to Moneague Training Camp
- Refurbish and build accommodation for the battalion and at least two hundred students

## **Chapter 7**

### **Implementation**

66. In order to ensure that the transformation occurs in a timely manner, an implementation plan has been drafted to facilitate the process. Analysis of the main deliverables from this review has revealed that they can be categorized within six broad areas as follows:

- a. Drafting or updating of policies
- b. Acquiring capital equipment
- c. Rationalizing manpower distribution
- d. Reorganizing the JDF structure
- e. Refurbishing and constructing infrastructure to support the capital acquisitions and reorganized JDF
- f. Implementing or improving processes to enhance operational efficiency

### **Policies**

67. There are fourteen policies identified by this review that are critical for the JDF to transform itself. These cover a range of areas including acquisition, education, pay and estate management. In Chapter 4, it was already noted that a J5 branch would be established to deal with Strategy, Plans and Policy. Though the process to establish this branch is not yet complete, work can commence on the drafting of these critical policies by a senior staff officer who may be the J5 designate. This individual would guide a number of teams led by the subject matter experts from the relevant units to draft the policies.

68. These policies will in turn form the framework within which most of the operations and administration of the force will take place. The higher priority policies such as those dealing with acquisitions and recruiting will be completed within three months, and the remainder within a year. The matrix at Appendix 1 outlines the 14 policies, the subject matter expert who will lead each drafting team, and the timeline for final submission of each draft policy.

## **Acquisitions**

69. The review has outlined a number of capital acquisitions that will form an important part of the JDF transformation. The acquisition policy and process will be undertaken in accordance with guidelines and regulations which govern procurement by public sector entities. In addition, prioritization of the acquisition of resources will have to be done to ensure timely and effective results given the fact that most of these are important and expensive items.

70. For each acquisition, the development of the detailed specifications will involve the end users and the procurement entity (such as the JDF Supply Depot). Depending on the value of the contract, the proposals will then be submitted to the JDF Equipment Procurement Committee (EPC), the National Contracts Commission (NCC) or Cabinet for approval.

## **Manpower**

71. Some of the measures required can be effected in the short term while others will require additional time to be realistically implemented. It is envisaged that there will be a rationalization of manpower throughout the Force with increases in some of areas and reallocation in others. The establishment of training schools for the Air Wing and Engineer Regiment will significantly enhance the capabilities of these units.

72. The total establishment for the Coast Guard will be four hundred and forty four (440) without cooks and medics, but until additional infrastructure changes are made to the main base and outstations the increases will have to be incremental. Eighteen persons were posted to the Coast Guard in October 2005 and eighteen more will be posted by April 2006 to facilitate the operation of the three new OPVs. This will bring the posted strength to two hundred and sixty two (262). For the long term, however, these figures will be revised upwards to meet the strategic mandate of the unit.

73. The increase to the establishment of one hundred and eleven (111) persons for the Air Wing will take place by September 2007 to fulfil the aircrew and ground-crew

requirements for the MPAs and additional helicopter. The establishment for the aircrew training school will be filled from existing Air Wing personnel.

74. The reserve establishment will be increased to include a new Engineer Squadron and an expanded Air Wing and Coast Guard. This will be done by rationalising existing establishments and the creation of new posts. The reallocation will be done as soon as the proposed establishment is approved by the Defence Board.

75. A company of one hundred and five (105) troops will be added to each of the infantry battalions. The increased establishment for the Infantry will be done by June 2006 but these new posts are not expected to be filled until 2008.


76. The newly created Combat Support Battalion will be formed from the nucleus of the existing JDF Training Depot and the Counter Terrorism group. New posts will be established for CJCSC, the museum/library, a Battalion Headquarters, as well as supporting elements. The total size of this unit will be three hundred and forty five (345). The size of the existing components is two hundred and forty one (241) so an additional one hundred and four (104) posts will be established by June 2006 and filled through recruiting over a three year period.

77. The plan calls for HQ JDF to spearhead the effort to rationalize the establishment and the reallocation of manpower throughout the force. The overall increase to the regular force is eight hundred (800), and two hundred and nineteen (219) for the reserve force.

## **Structure**

78. The proposal for the new structure is as outlined in Figure 4 below. The detailed composition with respect to manning will be submitted to the Defence Board by the first quarter of 2006. Final implementation is projected to be completed by December 2006.

Figure 4



## Infrastructure

79. Similar to the acquisitions programme, the implementation of the infrastructure component of this review will require significant capital outlay. Subject to the availability of funds, it is planned that new buildings be constructed and some existing ones refurbished. In some instances, the repair to existing buildings can be completed in less than three months while in other cases, the refurbishing period will be longer. HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF) and the units concerned will coordinate on the design and implementation of the projects identified. It is planned that the majority of the required buildings will be completed within five years.

## **Efficiency measures**

80. The review identified a number of processes that will enhance the operational efficiency of the JDF. These include the use of the intranet facility, full computerization of existing requisition and distribution systems, outsourcing of some activities, and the consolidation of some cost centres and activities. High priority items such as establishing clear lines of responsibility, the consolidation of messes, consolidation of the logistics function and the creation of a centralized QM department can be completed within six months.

81. The remainder of the issues which are more costly and/or which are more difficult to implement will require a longer implementation time. While this will clearly be an ongoing exercise, it is anticipated that most of these will be completed within the next five years.

## **The Transformation Timeline**

82. Military equipment and infrastructure procurement tends to have a long lead time due to the specialized nature of defence equipment. A phased implementation will ensure that the restructuring is done in a timely and affordable manner.

a. By 31 March 2006, the following will be done:

- (1) First phase of reallocation of manpower to JDF CG
- (2) Refurbishment of one OPV
- (3) Take delivery of two new OPVs
- (4) Complete research for troop carrying vehicles and order first set
- (5) Buy vehicle diagnostic equipment
- (6) Establish centralized quartermaster stores in Up Park Camp under the purview of JDF SD
- (7) Establish Base QM for each major outstation
- (8) Acquire Health Management software
- (9) Implement HR Software package
- (10) Consolidate Messes and Clubs in Up Park Camp
- (11) Move soldiers from Messes (Managers will remain as military personnel)
- (12) Reallocate some civilian posts to messes.
- (13) Establish Artisan Training School
- (14) Sp & Svcs Bn take over operations of Force Cookhouse.
- (15) Allocate additional manpower to JDF CG

- (16) Make Defence Board submission for the structural changes.
- b. By 30 June 2006, the following will be done:
- (1) Restructure the force HQ
  - (2) Start filling appointments in force HQ
  - (3) Acquire refrigerated truck
  - (4) Take delivery of one new OPV
  - (5) Continue refurbishment of the remaining IPVs.
  - (6) Allocate manpower to trade training school and start classes.
  - (7) Take delivery of first set of troop carrying vehicles.
  - (8) Start Aircrew Training School
- c. By 30 September 2006, the following will be done:
- (1) Reallocate posts within units and throughout the force to fill the new approved establishment.
  - (2) Continue filling appointments in force HQ.
  - (3) Refurbishment of two IPVs
  - (4) Acquire and upgrade specialist EOD/IEDD equipment
  - (5) Increase establishment for reserve force
  - (6) Establish Combat Support Battalion
  - (7) Establish additional regular infantry companies
  - (8) Reorganise Sp & Svcs Bn
- d. By 01 Jan 2007 the following will be done:
- (1) Start construction and refurbishing of barrack rooms in Up Park Camp to house both infantry Battalions.
  - (2) Start construction of new operations centre in Up Park Camp.
  - (3) Complete research and order patrol vehicles.
  - (4) Replace AS355N Helicopters
  - (5) Do research for procurement of twelve new IPVs
  - (6) Start construction and refurbishment of accommodation. This will be phased over a five year period.
- e. By 30 September, 2007 the following will be done:
- (1) Take delivery of communications equipment
  - (2) Continue refurbishing of the currently held seven IPVs
  - (3) Order new IPVs
  - (4) Acquire new Engineer Regiment equipment
  - (5) Take delivery of new patrol vehicles
  - (6) Acquire specialist weapons

- (7) Acquire vehicle tracking equipment
  - (8) Effect the increase in Air Wing's establishment
- f. By 30 September 2008 the following will be done:
- (1) Start construction of offices for new units
  - (2) Construct new integrated hanger facility
  - (3) Construct new berthing and marine workshop facilities
  - (4) Construct an urban joint training complex
- g. The following programmes will be ongoing:
- (1) Individual soldier proficiency
  - (2) Computerization of processes
  - (3) Preventative maintenance programme for vehicles
  - (4) Preventative maintenance programme for infrastructure

## Chapter 8

### A Transformed JDF Contributing to Security and Nation Building

83. A transformed JDF will deliver modern, flexible and capable forces to meet the evolving threats in the new strategic environment. As outlined earlier, the current trend is towards the development of modern capability-based military forces. The transformation will ensure that the component parts of the JDF are effectively commanded, organized, manned, trained, equipped and ready to assist in achieving the Government of Jamaica's security objectives. Amongst other things, this will allow the Jamaica Defence Force to:

- a. Assist and protect the Jamaican people in times of disaster and crisis.
- b. Secure Jamaica's border against the illegal entry of weapons, drugs and people.
- c. Improve the effectiveness of our joint operations with the JCF.
- d. Increase Jamaica's capacity to counter terrorist threats.
- e. Contribute towards the prevention of regional conflict and participate in regional crisis management.
- f. Employ defence diplomacy to support the government's objective in promoting peace at home and abroad.

84. The JDF, as a military force, has personnel trained to international standards in fifty-four (54) trade areas and twelve (12) professions supported with considerable leadership and management training. The implementation of the SDR will further enhance the flexibility of employment of the Force in support of national development beyond security in its

Strictest sense. Some of the areas that will benefit from these capabilities include the Ministry of Agriculture (fisheries protection), the Ministry of Transport and Works (port security), the Ministry of Health (early refugee detection and processing) as well as the Ministries of Water and Housing, Land and Environment (development projects). The JDF will continue to provide training as requested in assistance to other Government Agencies and Departments including support of youth development programmes.

85. As one of the largest providers of trained, educated and disciplined personnel to the wider society, the expenditure on personnel training and development will continue to benefit the country as persons leave the JDF to pursue other careers and take on leadership roles in the public and private sectors. The JDF has for some time been the main source of pilots for the national airline and has also supplied persons to the security and construction industries. The enhanced JDF will continue to use its multi-mission utility to deliver meaningful input to GOJ supported developmental projects and programmes. Further development of mutually beneficial partnerships with public, private, regional, and international entities is envisaged and will be pursued with the necessary approvals.

86. Though this review has outlined a series of far-reaching measures, it must be recognized that transformation is an ongoing process. The implementation process will be spearheaded by staff specifically earmarked and dedicated to developing the detailed plans and proposals. Many of the issues will have to be the subject of separate studies. The review, after examining current practices, allows a programme of implementation of changes some of which can be effected from within existing resources. This will enable the Force to realize immediate efficiencies and resource optimization. Technology will be integral to the improvement of systems and procedures of the JDF. It must be noted that continual reassessment is essential with a complete strategic review conducted periodically or in the event of any major change to the security landscape.

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## Appendix 1

### IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

#### Policies

<b>Policy</b>	<b>Subject matter expert (s) (and J5 designate)</b>	<b>Date for completion</b>
<b>Military Proficiency</b>	COs	31 March 2006
<b>Education</b>	Padre & J7	31 March 2006
<b>Career Planning</b>	J1	31 March 2006
<b>Medical</b>	FMO & FDO	31 March 2006
<b>Accommodation</b>	COs	31 March 2006
<b>Maintenance</b>	SEMEO	31 March 2006
<b>Cost Recovery</b>	J4 Fin	31 March 2006
<b>Inter-Agency co-operation</b>	J2/J3	30 June 2006
<b>Quality of Life</b>	IG/Padre	30 June 2006
<b>Pay and Allowances</b>	J4 Fin	30 June 2006
<b>Estate Management</b>	CO 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 June 2006
<b>Communications/MIS</b>	J6	31 December 2006
<b>Recruiting</b>	J1/J7 and COs	31 December 2006
<b>Acquisitions</b>	Colonel AQ and OC SD	31 December 2006

#### Acquisitions

<b>Refurbish and bring one of the currently held OPVs into service</b>	EPC, JDF CG	30 December 2005
<b>Acquire vehicle diagnostic and maintenance equipment</b>	EPC, Workshop	31 March 2006
<b>Troop Carrying Vehicles</b>	EPC, Infantry	30 September 2006
<b>Vehicle Tracking Equipment</b>	EPC, Sp and Svcs Bn	31 December 2006
<b>Acquire new engineer equipment</b>	EPC, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 March 2007
<b>Continue the refurbishing of the seven currently held IPVs</b>	EPC, JDF CG	30 September 2007
<b>Replace AS355N Helicopters</b>	EPC, JDF AW	30 September 2007
<b>Compatible Communications</b>	EPC, FCO, Infantry	30 September 2007
<b>Acquire appropriate specialist weapons</b>	EPC	30 September 2007
<b>Acquire and upgrade specialist EOD/IEDD equipment</b>	EPC	30 September 2007
<b>Acquire twenty nine (29) patrol vehicles</b>	EPC, Infantry	30 September 2007
<b>Implement Health Management Software</b>	EPC, MRS, ISC	30 September 2008
<b>Acquire twelve new IPVs</b>	EPC, JDF CG	30 September 2008
<b>Refurbish the existing fourteen (14) armoured cars</b>	EPC, Infantry	30 September 2008

<b>Acquire six (6) new armoured cars</b>	EPC, Infantry	30 September 2009
<b>Acquire two (2) Maritime Patrol Aircraft</b>	EPC, JDF AW	30 September 2009
<b>Acquire 1 Additional Bell 412 EP, and refurbish the existing three</b>	EPC, JDF AW	30 September 2009

### Manpower

<b>More Civilians in non-Combat Roles (messes etc)</b>	HQ JDF	31 March 2006
<b>Establishment of a Counter Terrorism Unit</b>	HQ JDF	31 January 2006
<b>Increased Reserve Forces</b>	HQ JDF	31 January 2006
<b>Aircrew Training School</b>	HQ JDF	31 January 2006
<b>Increased Establishment for Coast Guard</b>	HQ JDF	31 January 2006
<b>Artisan Training School</b>	HQ JDF	31 March 2006
<b>Assign Appropriate Staff to Strategic and Operations HQ</b>	HQ JDF	31 March 2006
<b>Increased Establishment for Air Wing</b>	HQ JDF	30 September 2006
<b>Increased Establishment for remainder of Force</b>	HQ JDF	30 September 2007

### Structure

<b>CJCSC</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006
<b>Reorganize Service Support Battalion</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006
<b>Establish Combat Support Battalion</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006
<b>Artisan Training School</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006
<b>Aircrew Training School</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006
<b>Headquarters JDF restructured</b>	HQ JDF	30 June 2006

### Infrastructure

<b>Consolidation of Dining Facilities</b>	HQ JDF, Sp and Svcs Bn	31 March 2006
<b>Artisan Training School</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	31 March 2006
<b>Aircrew Training School</b>	HQ JDF, JDF AW	30 September 2006
<b>New Operations Centre</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	31 December 2006
<b>Establishment of Special Forces</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 September 2007
<b>Construct an urban joint training complex</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 September 2008
<b>Offices for New Units</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 September 2008
<b>Construct a new integrated hangar facility</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 September 2008
<b>Construct new berthing and marine workshop facilities</b>	HQ JDF, JDF CG	30 September 2008
<b>Refurbish the existing accommodation over a five year period + construct</b>	HQ JDF, 1 Engr Regt (JDF)	30 September 2010

## Process

<b>Establish lines of Responsibilities</b>	HQ JDF	31 March 2006
<b>Consolidation of Cost Centres</b>	J4	31 March 2006
<b>Consolidation of Logistics Functions</b>	J4, OC SD	31 March 2006
<b>Establish a centralised QM Dept</b>	OC SD	31 December 2005
<b>Consolidation of Dining Facilities</b>	Sp & Svcs Bn	31 March 2006
<b>Implement a HR software package</b>	J1, J6	30 September 2006
<b>Restructuring Admin Functions</b>	J1	31 December 2006
<b>Preventative Maintenance Program for vehicles and Infrastructure</b>	1 Engr Regt (JDF), SEMEO	31 December 2006
<b>Individual Soldier Proficiency</b>	J7	30 September 2007
<b>Outsourcing of some Activities</b>	J4	31 March 2008
<b>Computerization of Processes</b>	J6	Ongoing